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NBRJCHAP
     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                            22 Cr. 303 (JMF)
                V.
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     GUSTAVO CHAVEZ,
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                                            Plea
                    Defendant.
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     -----x
 8
                                            New York, N.Y.
9
                                            November 27, 2023
                                            3:00 p.m.
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     Before:
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                          HON. JESSE M. FURMAN,
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                                            District Judge
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                               APPEARANCES
15
     DAMIAN WILLIAMS
          United States Attorney for the
16
          Southern District of New York
     ANDREW JONES
17
          Assistant United States Attorney
18
     DAVID E. PATTON
          Federal Defenders of New York, Inc.
19
          Attorney for the Defendant
     ANDREW J. DALACK
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     Also Present:
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     Jill Hoskins, Interpreter (Spanish)
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1	THE COURT: Good afternoon.
2	This is the matter of <i>United States v. Chavez</i> , 23 Cr.
3	303.
4	Counsel, please state your names for the record.
5	MR. JONES: Good afternoon, your Honor.
6	Andrew Jones for the government.
7	MR. DALACK: Good afternoon.
8	Andrew Dalack from the Federal Defenders of New York
9	on behalf of Gustavo Chavez.
10	THE COURT: Good afternoon to everyone.
11	Mr. Dalack, you're sporting a new longer beard.
12	MR. DALACK: Some travel overseas I'm hoping it will
13	be useful for.
14	THE COURT: Very good.
15	We are joined here by a Spanish language interpreter.
16	Let me just confirm with Mr. Chavez that he's able to
17	understand the interpreter and the headphones are working.
18	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
19	THE COURT: Okay. If at any point you have any
20	trouble understanding, please let me know right away so we can
21	take care of the problem. Understood?
22	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
23	THE COURT: All right. We are here because I
24	understand Mr. Chavez wishes to change his plea and enter a

plea of guilty to a lesser-included offense to Count One of the

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indictment, 22 Cr. 303; is that correct, Mr. Dalack? 1 2

MR. DALACK: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Before I accept your quilty plea, Mr. Chavez, I need to ask you certain questions to ensure that you are pleading quilty because you are, in fact, quilty and not for some other reason.

To ensure that you understand the rights that you would be giving up by pleading guilty and to ensure that you understand the consequences of a quilty plea, it is critical that you understand each question before you give me an answer. So if there's any question you do not understand, please let me know so that Mr. Dalack or I can explain it to you more fully. And if at any point you wish to speak to Mr. Dalack for any reason, let me know and I will give you however much time you need to speak with him.

Do you understand all that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Could you please rise and raise your right hand and I'll administer the oath to you.

(Defendant sworn)

THE COURT: You may be seated.

You are now under oath, which means that if you answer any of my questions falsely you may be subject to prosecution for the separate crime of perjury.

Do you understand that?

1	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
2	THE COURT: Can you tell me your full name, please.
3	THE DEFENDANT: Gustavo Adolfo Chavez.
4	THE COURT: How old are you?
5	THE DEFENDANT: 70.
6	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
7	THE DEFENDANT: 12 years, but in my country.
8	THE COURT: And where was that?
9	THE DEFENDANT: Nicaragua.
10	THE COURT: And have you ever been treated or
11	hospitalized for any type of mental illness?
12	THE DEFENDANT: I have not been inpatient, but I have
13	received treatment.
14	THE COURT: And can you tell me briefly what you've
15	received treatment for and when.
16	THE DEFENDANT: For depression.
17	THE COURT: And when?
18	THE DEFENDANT: That was about 10 10, 12 years ago.
19	THE COURT: Anything about either your depression or
20	the treatment you received that would affect your ability to
21	understand what's happening here today?
22	THE DEFENDANT: No. No.
23	THE COURT: Are you now or have you recently been
24	under the care of a doctor or a mental health professional such
25	as a psychiatrist or psychologist?

1	THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes.
2	THE COURT: And can you tell me what for?
3	THE DEFENDANT: I felt depressed. You know, being
4	shut up in my house, I couldn't sleep. So because of the
5	cancer treatment I received, it takes away my ability to sleep
6	well.
7	THE COURT: All right. And you're undergoing cancer
8	treatment now; is that correct?
9	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
10	THE COURT: And is there anything about either your
11	cancer, the treatment, your depression, or any treatment that
12	you've received that would affect your ability to understand
13	what's happening here today?
14	THE DEFENDANT: No. I fully understand everything
15	that's happening.
16	THE COURT: All right. And have you ever been treated
17	or hospitalized for any type of addiction including drug or
18	alcohol addiction?
19	THE DEFENDANT: Never, never.
20	THE COURT: In the last 48 hours, have you taken any
21	medicine, pills, drugs, or had any alcohol?
22	THE DEFENDANT: No. No, I don't drink.
23	THE COURT: Okay. But have you taken any medicine in
24	the last 48 hours for your cancer or anything else?
25	THE DEFENDANT: No. Not for the cancer, but I took

aspirin for my heart.

THE COURT: And does that affect your ability to understand what's going on here today?

THE DEFENDANT: No. No, not at all.

THE COURT: Aside from the aspirin, any other drugs, medicine, or pills that you've taken in the last 48 hours?

THE DEFENDANT: High blood pressure pills. It's 50 milligrams of losartan.

THE COURT: All right. And is your mind clear today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, of course.

THE COURT: And do you understand what's happening here today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Mr. Dalack, I see you've discussed this matter with Mr. Chavez?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have, Judge. And we have no concerns about Mr. Chavez's competence or ability to execute the pleaed today. I do expect after the plea is accepted I will address with the Court some issues concerning Mr. Chavez's sort of general cognitive functioning and how they relate to our application for continued bail under 3145(c), but none of those issues affect Mr. Chavez's competence or his ability to knowingly and voluntarily execute a plea today.

THE COURT: Okay. And in your judgment, does he understand the rights that he would be giving up by pleading

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MR. DALACK: I believe he does, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: And does either counsel have any doubt as to his competence to plead at this time? I guess Mr. Dalack already said no, but Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES: No doubts, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. On the basis of Mr. Chavez's responses to my questions, my observations of his demeanor here in court, and the representations of counsel, I find that he is fully competent to enter an informed plea of guilty at this time.

Mr. Chavez, have you received a copy of the indictment in this case, 22 Cr. 303 charging you with one count of narcotics trafficking?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And was it translated for you into Spanish?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Did you have enough time to discuss with Mr. Dalack the charge to which you are pleading guilty and any possible defenses to that charge?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And has Mr. Dalack explained to you the consequences of entering a guilty plea?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, of course.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with his representation of you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, of course.

THE COURT: All right. I'm now going to explain certain rights that you have. These are rights that you would be giving up by pleading guilty. And again, it's important for you to listen carefully, and if you don't understand something, let me know so that Mr. Dalack or I can explain.

Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, you have the right to plead not guilty to the charge in the indictment.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If you did plead not guilty, you would be entitled to a speedy and public trial by a jury on the charge in the indictment.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: At that trial, you would be presumed to be innocent and you would not have to prove that you were innocent. Instead, the government would be required to prove your guilt by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury could find you guilty.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: In order to find you guilty, a jury of 12 people would have to agree unanimously that you were guilty.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: At that trial and at every stage of your case, you would be entitled to be represented by a lawyer, and if you could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed at public expense free of cost to represent you.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: During a trial, the witnesses for the government would have to come to court and testify in your presence, and your lawyer could cross-examine those witnesses and object to any evidence offered against you. You would also have an opportunity to present evidence on your own behalf and you would have the right to have subpoenas issued or other process used to compel witnesses to come to court and testify in your defense.

Do you understand all of that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: At a trial, you would also have the right to testify on your own behalf, but you would have the right not to testify as well. And if you chose not to testify, then no one, including a jury, could draw any inference or a suggestion of guilt from the fact that you did not testify.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Before trial, you would have an opportunity, if you have not waived it, to seek supression or exclusion of any evidence offered against you or that the government would intend to offer against you at a trial.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If you were convicted at a trial, you would have the right to appeal that verdict and to appeal any pretrial rulings that I have made in your case.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If you plead guilty, you will also have to give up your right not to incriminate yourself because I may ask you or I will ask you questions to ensure that you are pleading guilty because you are, in fact, guilty and not for some other reason, and you will have to admit and acknowledge your guilt.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If you plead guilty and if I accept your guilty plea, you will give up your right to a trial and the other rights that we have just discussed other than your right to a lawyer, which you keep whether or not you plead guilty,

but there will be no trial and I will enter a judgment of guilty and sentence you on the basis of your plea after I have received a presentence report prepared by the United States Probation Department and any submissions that I get from your lawyer and the government's lawyer. There will be no appeal with respect to whether you did or did not commit the offense to which you're pleading guilty or with respect to whether the government could use the evidence that it has against you.

Do you understand all of that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Even now, as you are entering this plea, you have the right to change your mind, to plead not guilty, and to go to trial on the charge in the indictment.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand each and every one of the rights that I've just explained to you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And are you willing to give up your right to a trial and any other rights that we've just discussed?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Now, do you understand that you are charged in Count One of the indictment with distributing or possessing with the intent to distribute a controlled substance, namely, 400 grams or more of fentanyl in

violation of 21, U.S. Code, Section 812, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A).

Do you understand that that is the charge in the indictment?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that the government has agreed to accept a plea to a lesser-included offense, namely, distribution or possession with the intent to distribute a detectable amount of fentanyl, which is in violation of the same provisions, but instead of 841(b)(1)(A), it's 841(b)(1)(C).

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jones, would you please state the elements of that offense.

MR. JONES: Yes, your Honor.

The lesser-included offense has three elements:

The first is that the defendant knowingly and intelligently possessed a controlled substance; second, he possessed the controlled substance with the intent to distribute it; and, third, that the substance was, in fact, fentanyl. Additionally, we would have to prove venue in the Southern District of New York.

THE COURT: Do you understand that, if you were to go to trial, that the government would have to prove those first

three elements Mr. Jones said beyond a reasonable doubt to convict you of the offense to which you're pleading guilty?

Do you understand that.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And in addition, the government would have to prove that venue was proper in this district, that is, that something in connection with the offense occurred in this district, but its burden on that would be a preponderance of the evidence, but not beyond a reasonable doubt.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Let me tell you now about the maximum possible punishment for this crime. And by "this crime" I mean the lesser-included offense to which you're pleading guilty, and by "maximum" I mean the most that could possibly be imposed upon you. It doesn't mean that that is the sentence you will receive, but you do have to understand that by pleading guilty you are exposing yourself to a combination of punishments up to the statutory maximums.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. First, let me tell you about the possible restrictions on your liberty. The maximum term of imprisonment for this crime is 20 years in prison, which could be followed by up to a lifetime term of supervised release.

Supervised release means that you would be subject to supervision by the probation department. There would be rules of supervised release that you would be required to follow, and if you violated any of those rules, you could be returned to prison to serve additional time without a jury trial and without credit for the time you served on your underlying sentence or time spent on post-release supervision.

Do you understand all that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: There is no parole in the federal system, which means that if you were sentenced to prison, you would not be released early on parole. There is a limited opportunity to earn credit for good behavior, but if you were sentenced to prison, you would have to serve at least 85 percent of the time to which you were sentenced.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: In addition to these restrictions on your liberty, the maximum possible punishment also includes certain financial penalties. First, the maximum allowable fine is the greatest of \$1 million or twice the gross pecuniary or financial grain derived from the offense or twice the gross pecuniary loss to one other than you as a result of the offense; second, I can order restitution to any person or entity injured as a result of your criminal conduct; third, I

can order you to forfeit all property derived from the offense or used to facilitate or commit the offense; and, finally, I must order a mandatory special assessment of \$100.

Do you understand that those are the maximum possible penalties?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: In addition, you should understand that this crime carries a mandatory minimum of three years of supervised release, that is to say that absent a basis for relief from the mandatory minimum, I would be required to impose at least three years of supervised release following any term of imprisonment.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Are you a citizen of the United States, Mr. Chavez?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: You understand that as a result of your guilty plea there may be effects on your immigration status in this country. For instance, you may be detained by immigration authorities following the completion of any sentence, you may be removed from the United States, you may be denied admission in the United States in the future, and you may be denied citizenship in the United States. Do you understand that those are among the kinds of immigration consequences that may follow

from a guilty plea?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And have you discussed the possible immigration consequences of your plea with Mr. Dalack?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that as a result of your guilty plea, you may also lose certain rights that you have in this country, to the extent that you have them, or could otherwise obtain them such as the right to vote, the right to hold public office, the right to serve on a jury, and the right to possess any kind of firearm.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you serving any other sentence, either state or federal, or being prosecuted in any other court at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if Mr. Dalack or anyone else for that matter has attempted to predict what your sentence will be in this case, that their predictions could be wrong? Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: It's important to understand that no one, not your lawyer, not the government's lawyer, no one can give you any promise or assurance as to what your sentence will be

in this matter because your sentence will be determined by me and by me alone, and I'm not going to do that today. Instead, I will wait until I receive the presentence report that the probation department will prepare. I will do my own calculation of how the United States Sentencing Guidelines apply to your case. I will consider any possible departures from the guidelines range. I'll consider any submissions I get from the lawyers, and, ultimately, I will consider the factors that are set forth in the statute that governs sentencing 18, U.S. Code, Section 3553(a). I'll do all of that before I determine and impose an appropriate sentence on you.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And have you discussed that process, the sentencing process with Mr. Dalack?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, even if your sentence is different from what Mr. Dalack or anyone else has told you that it might be, even if it is different from what you hope or expect it to be, and even if it is different from what may be in the plea agreement we'll discuss in one moment, you will still be bound by your guilty plea and you will not be allowed to withdraw your plea.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, of course.

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THE COURT: Now, I understand that there is a written plea agreement that you and Mr. Dalack have entered into with the government; is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: I have an original letter plea agreement here dated November 20, 2023, signed by Mr. Jones, addressed to Mr. Dalack. Turning to the last page, it appears, Mr. Chavez, that you signed this plea agreement dated today, November 27. Is that your signature on the last page, if you can see it from there? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And before you signed the plea agreement, did you read it? Or was it interpreted for you into Spanish? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And before you signed it, did you discuss it with Mr. Dalack? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Before you signed it, did Mr. Dalack explain it to you and answer any questions you may have had about the plea agreement? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And before you signed the plea agreement, did you fully understand it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, one of the features of your agreement

with the government is that you and the government have agreed upon how the United States Sentencing Guidelines apply to your case; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: It's important for you to understand that that agreement is binding on you and it is binding on the government, but it's not binding on me. I have my own independent obligation to determine what the direct guidelines range is. I'm not suggesting to you that I will calculate the range differently, but if I did and even if I calculated a higher range than the one to which you've agreed, you would still be bound by your guilty plea and you would not be allowed to withdraw your plea.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Another feature of your agreement is that you admit to the forfeiture allegation with respect to Count One of the indictment.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you, in fact, admit to the forfeiture allegation with respect to Count One?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, one final provision of this agreement that I want to bring to your attention is that you agree to

waive or give up your right to appeal or otherwise challenge any sentence that is within or below the stipulated sentencing guidelines range of 87 to 108 months' imprisonment. That means that if I were to sentence you to 108 months in prison or anything less than that, that you would have no right to appeal or otherwise challenge that sentence.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Does this written plea agreement constitute your complete and total understanding of the entire agreement between you and the government?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Has anything been left out of this written plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Other than what is written in this agreement, has anyone made any promise to you or offered you any inducement to plead guilty or to sign the plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: And has anyone threatened you or forced you to plead guilty or to sign the plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Has anyone made a promise to you as to what your sentence will be?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: All right. Having asked you all those questions, Mr. Chavez, at this time I would ask you how do you plead to the lesser-included offense to Count One, guilty or not guilty?

First, Mr. Chavez, just is it correct that you plead guilty to the lesser-included offense that I described earlier?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And now can you tell me in your own words what you did that makes you believe that you are guilty of that crime? And if you prefer to read from prepared remarks, that's also fine, just read slowly and clearly and wait for the interpreter to catch up to you, okay?

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Once the interpreter is in position, you may proceed.

THE DEFENDANT: On April 28, 2022, I received a package from someone and I agreed to take it to my home and to keep it there until another person would arrive to pick it up in my apartment, and my apartment is in the Bronx. I didn't know what was inside the package, but I had a reason to believe that it contained drugs. I thought that not looking at what was inside the package, that way I wasn't violating any law, but I now know that what I did was wrong.

I should never have accepted the package. I am very sorry for having done this. I am not a drug trafficker, and I

feel very bad for having been involved in this case. May God have mercy on me.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you a couple of followup questions, if I can.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: First of all, I saw that you were reading from a prepared set of remarks, which is certainly fine, indeed, quite common, just to make sure that you speak accurately and clearly. But just to confirm, what was written in that document, that is all true and correct; is that true?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Second, you said you had reason to believe that the package contained drugs. I just want to understand exactly is it correct to say that while you didn't know for sure, that you knew or believed that there was some illegal drug in the package that you accepted; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I had reason to believe that the package that I received on April 28, 2022 contained drugs because --

THE INTERPRETER: May the interpreter clarify?

THE COURT: Yes.

THE DEFENDANT: Because I had previously received a package by mail. I had opened it and saw that it contained drugs.

THE COURT: All right. And I take it you did not open the package that you were given on April 28, 2022; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

THE COURT: And is that correct that you didn't do so in part because you didn't want to find out exactly or confirm your belief that there were drugs inside; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And I understand that at the time you believed that because you avoided confirmation that it was drugs, that you didn't believe at the time that you were violating the law, but you understand and know now that that is a violation of the law; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jones, can you proffer briefly what the contents of that package were, both its weight and -- well, I guess weight is not critical, given the plea, but what the contents were.

MR. JONES: Yes, your Honor.

That package contained about 3 kilograms of controlled substances. I think it was two of fentanyl and one of fentanyl analogue.

Just, if the case were to go to trial, I think in further support of the idea that the defendant knew or at minimum was willfully avoiding the knowledge that there was

drugs in the box, I'd proffer at trial we'd put on evidence that about two weeks earlier, he had delivered a measure of fentanyl, about 6 grams of powder, I think about 100 grams of pills to a DEA confidential source, which was ultimately the reason he was under surveillance on April 28. Also, following his arrest on April 28, when the contents of the box were seized, his apartment was searched and there was another kilogram, give or take, of fentanyl or fentanyl analogue inside of his apartment then.

THE COURT: All right. And doing this a little backwards, but as long as you're standing and have proffered some of it, can you tell me what the government would prove if the defendant were to go to trial and what the evidence would be and what it would show.

MR. JONES: I think in addition to the things we just mentioned, we'll put all that in through a combination of surveillance video that would show the defendant having received the box that he was arrested with on April 28. I would expect the confidential source that he had previously given drugs to would testify, and law enforcement officers would also testify about the fentanyl he was carrying that day. We'd have lab reports to speak to the specific drugs that were seized and expert testimony to back up the lab reports.

THE COURT: All right. A few questions, Mr. Dalack.

Number one, any dispute or objection that the government would

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prove that the package contained fentanyl? 1 2 MR. DALACK: I do not dispute that, your Honor. THE COURT: Could you just use the mic. 3 4 MR. DALACK: I do not contest that, Judge. 5 THE COURT: And I assume you agree as a matter of law 6 that Mr. Chavez is accountable for that drug type, even if he 7 didn't know what the drug type was, that by virtue of the fact 8 that he was personally and directly involved in the transaction, that he's on the hook for it? 9 10 MR. DALACK: Yes, Judge. 11 THE COURT: Okay. I assume you also agree this 12 mistake of law, presuming that he did not believe at the time 13 that he was violating the law, that that is not a valid 14 defense; is that correct? 15 MR. DALACK: That's correct, Judge. THE COURT: And finally, do you agree that his 16 17 allocution is sufficient to satisfy the knowledge requirement, 18 either directly or through a willful blindness theory? 19 MR. DALACK: Yes, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: All right. And are you aware of any valid 21 defense that would prevail at trial or of any reason Mr. Chavez 22 should not be permitted to plead quilty to the lesser-included 23 offense?

to putting before the Court substantial mitigation concerning

No, your Honor. But we do look forward

MR. DALACK:

the offense conduct.

THE COURT: Do both counsel agree there is a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea to the lesser-included offense to Count One?

MR. JONES: Yes, your Honor.

MR. DALACK: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Does either counsel know of any reason that I should not accept the defendant's plea of guilty?

MR. JONES: No.

MR. DALACK: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Chavez, because you acknowledge that you are, in fact, guilty to the lesser-included offense to Count One as charged in the indictment, because I am satisfied that you know of your rights including your right to go to trial, and that you are aware of the consequences of your plea, including the sentence that may be imposed upon you, and because I find that you are knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty, I accept your guilty plea and enter a judgment of guilty --

MR. DALACK: Forgive me, your Honor. I think there might be an issue with the headphones. It's been about a minute that it stopped working.

THE INTERPRETER: Apologies, your Honor. It seems that the interpreter inadvertently pressed the mute button. The interpreter asked the defendant how long it had been that

he was not hearing clearly. He said about one minute.

THE COURT: Could you maybe ask what was the last thing that he did hear?

THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't remember, but I acknowledge -- I understand what I pled guilty to and what I acknowledge and I'm very sorry.

THE COURT: All right. I suspect you may have missed some of my back and forth with the lawyers. Just they're confirming that they agree that there is a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea. And Mr. Dalack said that he was not aware of any valid defense that would prevail at trial or of any reason that you should not be permitted to plead guilty.

And then, perhaps most importantly, I then said and will say again that because you acknowledged that you are, in fact, guilty as to the lesser-included offense to Count One, because I am satisfied that you know of your rights, including your right to go to trial, and because you understand the potential consequences of your plea, including the sentence that may be imposed upon you, and because I find that you are knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty, I accept your guilty plea and enter a judgment of guilty on the lesser-included offense to Count One of the indictment.

Do you understand all that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understood it perfectly.

THE COURT: All right. The probation department will

want to interview you in connection with the presentence report that it will prepare. It is important that if you choose to speak with the probation department, that anything you say is truthful and accurate. Among other things, that report is important to me in deciding what sentence to impose upon you before sentencing you, and Mr. Dalack will have an opportunity to review the report. I would urge you to review it with care, and if you find any mistakes in the report or anything that you wish to bring to my attention in connection with your sentencing, that you share that with Mr. Dalack so he can share with me in turn.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

MR. DALACK: I do wish to be present, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: I was about to ask you that. I'll order that no interview take place unless counsel is present.

Sentencing will be set for, let's say, March 7 at 3:00 p.m. Again, March 7 at 3 p.m.

I direct the government to provide the probation department with its factual statement of the offense within seven days. Defense counsel must arrange for Mr. Chavez to be interviewed by probation within the next two weeks. In accordance with my individual rules and practices, defense submissions with respect to sentencing are due two weeks prior to sentencing, and the government's submissions due one week

prior to sentencing.

That brings us to the issue of bail, which Mr. Dalack alluded to earlier. What is the government's position with respect to bail? Obviously, this is a 3143(a)(2) plea, but what's the government's position?

MR. JONES: Only that it is 3143(a)(2) and required absent exceptional reasons, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. I meant 3143. Thanks for the catch.

Mr. Dalack, tell me why you think under 3145(c)

release is appropriate.

MR. DALACK: First, your Honor, as a threshold matter, Mr. Chavez is able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a danger to the community nor a flight risk. Mr. Chavez stands before the Court a 70-year-old man without any criminal record whatsoever, certainly no record or any indication that he has ever engaged in any act of violence in his life.

This is his first and only interaction with the justice system. To give the Court a little bit of context and color — and I expect to get into this in much more detail at sentencing — at the time of Mr. Chavez's arrest, he was sort of running an off-the-books taxi company to try and make some extra money. And in the course of operating that taxi company, individuals that he doesn't know who they are would get his number and ask him to deliver packages on their behalf.

At one point, he discovered that the packages he was being asked to — at least one of the packages — to hold on to contained drugs in it. And Mr. Chavez was nervous and scared about what to do with that information and also mistakenly believed that if he didn't look inside of the packages that he wouldn't be violating the law. Mr. Chavez obviously understands now that that's not the way the law works, that wouldn't be a defense at trial.

In informing his sort of judgment and decision making with respect to his decision to receive packages and to continue to hold on to them on behalf of people he didn't know, I had Mr. Chavez evaluated by an experienced neuropsychologist in connection with a mitigation submission I made to the U.S. Attorney's Office. While the neuropsychologist did not determine that Mr. Chavez suffers from dementia, which was a concern of ours, the neuropsychologist did determine that he possesses a low fund of knowledge and that he has a low intellectual ability and meets the criteria for a neurocognitive disorder and intellectual disability and also a panic disorder. And as a result, Mr. Chavez struggles —

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honor, could I ask the attorney to start again with the diagnosis, perhaps just a little more slowly.

MR. DALACK: I had foreshadowed that would be a problem today, so I apologize.

Dr. Seltz, the neuropsychologist, that I retained, indicates Mr. Chavez meets the criteria for a neurocognitive disorder, an intellectual disability, and a panic disorder, and that as a result, he struggles with higher order cognitive functions, including exercising adequate abstract reasoning skills, and he processes information much more slowly than average. His intellectual disability also manifests in deficits in his reasoning, problem solving, planning, abstract thinking, and judgment features of his mental health. Your Honor, that helps explain how he was able to rationalize his offense conduct and delude himself into believing that he was not breaking the law if he didn't look into the packages.

I expect that we're going to get into a lot more detail at the time of sentencing about how these diagnoses not only affect his culpability and mitigate his culpability with respect to the offense, but why they weigh quite heavily in favor of a nonincarceratory sentence, one of those rare circumstances where a significant variance is present under 3553(a).

But separate and apart from the cognitive issues that Dr. Seltz has diagnosed, Mr. Chavez also suffers from a host of physical ailments. As he alluded to earlier, he's previously suffered from prostate cancer. His PSA levels as of July of this year have been elevated and he is due for another round of lab work on January 2 to determine whether or not he requires

additional rounds of chemotherapy or other more aggressive treatment to deal with a possible reemergence of prostate cancer.

In addition, he suffers from hypertension. He's a type 2 diabetic who requires pretty intensive medical treatment and care. He has sciatica that's related to his diabetes. And one of the reasons, one of the core reasons which pretrial services had recommended and agreed to a substantial downgrading of Mr. Chavez's release conditions from home incarceration to a curfew was to help facilitate his ability to attend his myriad doctors' appointments that were just becoming very difficult for pretrial to arrange under a home incarceration regime.

absolutely no problems whatsoever on pretrial release over the past 20 months. He's an outstanding releasee who maintains an excellent rapport with Marlon Ovalles of pretrial services.

Again, it's been pretrial who has urged me to ask the Court to downgrade his bail in order to facilitate his ability to get the medical treatment he needs. I think it's axiomatic that he's not going to receive anything remotely close to that kind of care if he were to be detained at MDC and that putting him in that kind of environment would pose an unnecessary risk to his life, especially given his age and the likely reemergence of his prostate cancer.

So it's for those reasons that are specific to Mr. Chavez that we submit there is an exceptional basis or exceptional reasons justifying his continued release on bail pending sentencing. And I have all the confidence that Mr. Chavez will continue to scrupulously adhere to his bail conditions as he has over the past 20 months.

THE COURT: Okay. As it happens — I think you know this — I have under advisement a request to keep another client of yours out on bail under similar circumstances, *United States v. Irizarry*, I think 23 Cr. 60 is the docket number. In that case you made arguments concerning the conditions in the MDC on top of individual circumstances. Do you incorporate those arguments by reference here?

MR. DALACK: I do, your Honor, and specifically would incorporate the arguments I made about the approach that Judge Engelmayer has taken just across the hall, that if a person has been doing well on bail and there's no indication that he poses or she poses a risk to public safety or a flight risk, that detaining that person at the MDC, given the decrepit conditions there, would be inappropriate and that the conditions at the MDC themselves create a basis to continue a person's detention.

I think without trying to argue against myself in connection with my representation of Mr. Irizarry, I think here he's differently situated than Mr. Irizarry. So to the extent Mr. Irizarry's case is a closer call, given his record and

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another circumstances, those concerns aren't present with Mr. Chavez. He's never been in trouble before. This offense conduct is really aberrational. He's an old man who requires intensive medical care. He's certainly not going to get it at the MDC. And your Honor should, in the interest of justice, continue his bail pending sentencing.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, let me hear from you on the MDC There was a meeting recently of the Criminal Justice Advisory Board, at which the, I think, associate warden of the MDC reported the most recent statistic was that the custodial staff was at 48 percent of its full staffing level. I don't know if you know that number offhand or perhaps I can ask you to find it out, but my impression -- I mean, I've been dealing with issues relating to the MDC for years. And the repeated explanation - and certainly understandable - is that there's just chronic and severe staffing shortages. And that's all well and good, but it does strike me that there's a pretty strong argument for not putting additional people, that if the Department of Justice and the BOP can't get that issue under control and solve it, that the only other solution is to reduce or at least not add to the prison population unnecessarily. And in that regard, somebody who he has been compliant strikes me as a pretty good candidate for not being added to that number.

So can you address that issue separate and apart from

anything specific to Mr. Chavez?

MR. JONES: Your Honor, I certainly can't cite the staffing level. What I know is mostly from news reporting, but I do understand that it is staffing issues that do frequently drive or occasionally drive, whatever the right adjective is, lockdowns or various other issues at the MDC. And I recognize that is a concern that the Court has.

As to Mr. Chavez specifically, I think insofar as Mr. Dalack identified a host of physical ailments and certain requirements that he has for medical treatment that I think we'd all probably agree won't be addressed the same way at MDC versus continuing bail, I don't really have a position there. I leave it to the Court whether that's exceptional or not. I understand the Court's point about MDC conditions broadly, absent specific circumstances of the defendant. I don't know that that rises to the level of exceptional, but I recognize that's not the only thing that's present here.

You know, same with the mitigation about the way

Mr. Chavez was trying to fool himself like it's not a crime if

I don't look in the box, I think that's probably most

appropriately addressed at sentencing and probably wouldn't

accept that as an exceptional circumstance, but I understand

that is just one piece of a larger application being made.

THE COURT: All right. So I think there's a pretty strong argument for exceptional circumstances in Mr. Chavez's

individual case, given his medical condition, but I'm going to, strictly speaking, reserve judgment and ask Mr. Jones to get me some information that may be helpful to me in evaluating the application more broadly.

That is to say by Thursday I want a letter from the government telling me, number one, what the current staffing levels are at the MDC, both in custodial staff and also in the medical staff. Given Mr. Chavez has various medical conditions that would require care, I think that is relevant. I want to know what the current inmate population is and, therefore, what the ratio is between the two. And I'd like those same figures, basically, let's say at six-month intervals for the last three years just to have a sense of whether and to what extent the staffing level has gotten worse, better, or remained the same.

Because, again, my impression is that this has been a chronic and severe problem, that it is, indeed, the root cause of any number of problems at the MDC. And unless and until it is fixed — and that doesn't seem to be likely any time soon — that there are other things that perhaps need to be done and that may bear on the application that's being made.

Okay, Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JONES: Just making sure I heard the Court's request. I will get the transcript, but custodial, medical

percentage staffing levels, inmate population, and looking backwards every six months back three years?

THE COURT: Correct.

So just to be clear, I want to know what the total staffing level is slated at, that is what it's budgeted for, what percent they're currently at. That should include and reflect any medical leave, any military leave, any leave of that sort, so any sick leave. Because I think that part of the problem is that these numbers are compounded by frequent sick calls and officers who simply don't show up, so what the actual attendance is on an average basis at the moment and that comparable number going back again at six-month intervals for three years.

And I'm guessing that the Bureau of Prisons can get you that information relatively easily. And if it makes sense to report it in some other way, I'm not wedded to that particular definition or description. But fundamentally, I want to know how many people are actually on staff working and whether the problem has gotten worse, remained the same, or gotten any better. Okay?

MR. JONES: Understood.

THE COURT: And custodial staff and medical staff.

Mr. Dalack?

MR. DALACK: Thanks, Judge.

I would just ask to receive the same information, of

course, as well, and have the opportunity to be heard further, to the extent the Court wishes.

THE COURT: It will be filed on the docket, so you and the rest of the world will get it, unless there's a security reason to do otherwise, in which case the government can make an application to me, but certainly, I think there's a public interest in that information. And in terms of response, I'll leave it to you. If you, upon receiving it, feel that there's a need for a response, you can make an application. But let me say that without getting advance permission for a response, then we'll leave it there. Okay?

MR. DALACK: Thanks, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. And I guess to the extent that you're familiar with these issues, are there any other data that you think might be helpful to me in evaluating the situation?

MR. DALACK: Just in connection with my representation of Mr. Irizarry in 23 Cr. 60, I had appended to the opening letter a memorandum from the union representative for the staff at MDC Brooklyn, who lamented the severe staffing shortages. Anecdotally, I can say that my understanding is at any given point there's one correctional officer responsible for three units and that that results in sort of indefinite lockdowns, that it's even worse on the weekends. So that routinely people who are detained at the MDC are not allowed out of their cells

pretty much at a minimum three days of the week, Friday, Saturday, Sunday, given the severe staffing shortages there.

I also want to say, too, that notwithstanding whatever staffing might be available at MDC Brooklyn in their medical unit, I'm not aware of the MDC being equipped to handle Mr. Chavez's specific needs, especially as they pertain to monitoring his PSA levels and helping him receive chemotherapy and treatment for his cancer, should his oncologist believe that's warranted. And certainly, the Court can have no confidence whatsoever that the MDC will make Mr. Chavez available for any of his medical appointments.

I think I had mentioned in my opening letter on behalf of Mr. Irizarry, a case involving another client of mine, Mr. Raul Acosta, who is still awaiting reconstructive surgery for his face, despite numerous orders from various judges in this district requiring the MDC to promptly make that available to him. It's gotten to the point where, as I mentioned in that letter, his face has healed improperly and they now have to re-break it in order to perform reconstructive plastic surgery. So I certainly came prepared with a number of anecdotal reasons as to why the MDC is a miserable place to be for anybody, but especially for somebody who clearly does not pose a risk to public safety or a flight risk.

Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

So as I said, I will reserve judgment, although certainly I think that there's a pretty compelling argument here and just want to get a complete record before I rule on it. Unless and until I say otherwise, Mr. Chavez will remain free subject to the conditions of release that he has been on to date.

Mr. Chavez, let me stress a couple things to you. First, you must continue to comply with the conditions of your release. If you don't, then that may affect your release and leave me to remand you, separate and apart from what I've just discussed with the lawyers.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And in addition, I will tell you that if you violate the terms of your release, that may also have significance to me in deciding what sentence to impose upon you when it comes time for sentencing.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And in addition, you must be here in this courtroom on the date and time that I set for sentencing. That is March 7 of next year at 3:00 p.m. You should stay in touch with Mr. Dalack and he'll let you know if that date, time, and location changes. But unless and until I change it, you must be here for sentencing at that time and on

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